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A. INTRODUCTION
Property is political. The extent to which a society restricts or encourages freedom
of ownership and the accumulation of wealth reflects the values of that society,
whether they spring from a Marxist ideology at one end of the political spectrum
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or from a commitment to liberal individualism and the operation of a free market
at the other.1 Property ownership is the foundation stone of a capitalist economy2
and the spread of home ownership a core philosophy of all modern political
parties.
The extent to which the law should interfere with individual choice in relation
to family behaviour is an issue which elicits a range of views across the political
spectrum, closely related to preference for “big” or “small” government and
sympathy (or lack of it) for a degree of social engineering. Modern British
governments tread warily in this territory, reluctant to create controversy or to risk
accusations of being a “nanny” state. But none has completely eschewed policy
initiatives which affect the institution of the family.
Inheritance straddles these core institutions of property and family, for
it involves the transfer of wealth between family members. Whatever legal
framework is adopted to govern inheritance involves political choices. First, and
on the assumption that ownership includes the freedom to dispose of property as
we wish in life or in death,3 a position has to be adopted on the extent to which
the state will limit that freedom. Secondly, because creating inheritance rules
involves conceptualising family life, choices must be made about the merits of
particular forms of “family” and of particular relationships within that family. The
law selects winners and losers on the basis of those political choices. The Scottish
Law Commission’s recent discussion paper on Succession4 contains proposals for
a radical reform of inheritance law. This discussion paper is, therefore, inherently
political.
This article does not claim to provide a solution to the complexities of creating
a satisfactory set of rules to govern inheritance. Rather it seeks to evaluate the
reform proposals in terms of the Scottish Law Commission’s own stated objectives
of creating “a fair and rational system that adequately reflects majority views”.5
Those views will be examined in the light of recent research studies and of wider
1 This is not to overlook the influence of religious belief in the formation of cultural values, but the focus
of this article is on the political ideology prevalent in western secular democracies.
2 C B MacPherson, “Property as means or end”, in A Parel and T Glanagan (eds), Theories of Property
(1979) 3; H de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (2000) ch 1.
3 This appears to be the basis on which the law currently operates. This article does not seek to contribute
to the wider debate about the morality of inherited wealth and its potential for widening the inequality
gap. The starting point is an assumption that inheritance as a concept is unlikely to be challenged and
that future debate will focus on reduction of the tax burden on inherited wealth: see A Mumford,
“Inheritance in socio-political content: the case for reviving the sociological discourse of inheritance
tax law” (2007) J Law & Soc 567.
4 Discussion Paper on Succession (Scot Law ComDP No 136, 2007; available at www.scotlawcom.gov.uk)
(henceforth DP).
5 DP para 2.2.
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policy implications. And on a more profound level, the underlying ideology of
the discussion paper will be explored in order to assess whether the proposals
represent an appropriate inheritance model for Scots law in the twenty-first
century.
B. THE REFORM PROPOSALS
The discussion paper reviews two important aspects of succession law: the default
rules governing intestacy and the regime of “legal rights”,6 a term of art in Scots
law which denotes the centuries-old mechanism preventing the deceased from
disinheriting a spouse or civil partner7 or a child.8 These issues are separate but
related, for both affect the allocation of the deceased’s property to immediate
family members. The overall trend in the discussion paper is to prioritise the
rights of spouses: where there is a surviving spouse the inheritance rights of
all other family members, including children, are either diminished or removed
entirely. It is important to examine the underlying reasons for a change which will
have a significant impact on Scottish families.
(1) Rationale for the rules of intestacy
The current rules of intestacy need reform, according to the discussion paper,
because they “sometimes fail to provide a fair result”.9 One example of unfairness
is that where a deceased leaves behind a spouse but no children, the deceased’s
parents and siblings could in some cases inherit a “substantial proportion”.
In those circumstances, the proposal is to give the whole estate to the spouse – one
of the less controversial measures in the discussion paper. Matters are more
complex and “difficult”10 where the deceased is survived by both a spouse and by
children. Again it is claimed that the current rules sometimes produce “unjust and
anomalous results”,11 in that the children may get too much and the spouse too
little. The proposals aim therefore to give the surviving spouse all of a “modest”
6 The umbrella term “legal rights” includes the legitim of children and the jus relictae or jus relicti of
female and male spouses respectively.
7 With the introduction of (same-sex) civil partnerships by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the positions of
a surviving spouse and a surviving civil partner are equalised in succession law. See 2004 Act s 131. To
avoid repetition, “spouse” is used in this article to include both a spouse and a civil partner.
8 In this article the term “children” is used to denote the wider concept of issue, i.e. children or their
descendants, for a predeceasing child can be represented by her descendants for most purposes in
intestate succession (Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 s 11).
9 DP para 1.8.
10 DP para 2.27.
11 DP para 2.28.
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estate and to allow children to share in a “substantial” estate.12 These terms are
not defined, but, as will be demonstrated, the proposals only achieve this objective
if “substantial” is taken to refer to the estates of a small and wealthy minority.13
It is interesting how often the discussion paper appeals to “justice” or “injustice”.
These terms are left unexplained but, broadly speaking, in relation to intestacy
the Law Commission appears to deem it “fair” when a spouse gets more or less
everything and “unfair” when anyone else gets much.
(2) Protection from disinheritance and ideology
In relation to legal rights, the Scottish Law Commission’s reasoning is more
explicit, in acknowledgement of the radical nature of its proposals. A new concept
of “legal shares” is proposed, whereby spouses can claim 25% of what they would
be entitled to on intestacy if they are not (or not generously enough) provided for
in the deceased’s will.14 For the deceased’s children the proposal is to remove the
right of legitim currently available to all children and to replace it, for dependent
children only, with a new discretionary claim.15 Discretionary rights are treated
inconsistently in the discussion paper.16 They are rejected for spouses,17 on
the basis that court-based awards are uncertain, inconvenient, expensive, and
likely to provoke litigation at a time of bereavement,18 but are retained both for
cohabitants19 and for dependent children20 on the ground that a fixed rule would
not take account of “need”.21 Hilary Hiram argues that this shift from “a kind
of deferred community of property” towards “need” as an inheritance criterion
“[denies] to children legal recognition as family members”.22 Importantly, the
Commission accepts that a child’s right to legitim does not derive from need
but “from the parent-child relationship itself”.23 The proposed removal of
legitim, therefore, logically implies that the Commission no longer regards the
parent-child relationship as a sufficiently strong reason in itself to confer a right
of inheritance.
12 DP para 2.38.
13 On the most recent statistics, only 2% of intestate estates are worth more than £300,000, the proposed
threshold at which children will be able to make a claim on an intestate estate: see D.(4)(a) below.
14 25% of the value of an estate up to a £300,000 limit, plus a further one-eighth share of any balance.
15 See H Hiram, “Reforming succession law: legal rights” (2008) 12 EdinLR 81.
16 Hiram (n 15) at 85-86.
17 DP para 3.39.
18 DP para 3.34.
19 To mirror a cohabitant’s discretionary claim on intestacy, for which see Family Law (Scotland) Act
2006 s 29.
20 I.e. children whom the deceased had an obligation to aliment: DP para 3.80.
21 DP para 3.81.
22 Hiram (n 15) at 84.
23 DP para 3.92.
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The removal of legitim is likely to prove the most controversial proposal in the
discussion paper. Indeed in view of the public support for protecting children
from disinheritance, discussed below,24 and the fact that Scotland, together with
most other European jurisdictions, has a long tradition of doing so, it is not clear
why the Commission regards this as a “difficult and controversial”25 question.
The same issue has vexed the Commission for almost 20 years. In its earlier, and
unimplemented, report on Succession, it was similarly “attracted” to the idea
of limiting legitim to dependent children but abandoned the proposal on the
grounds that it was out of line with both public opinion and the consultation
responses.26
This second attempt to convince is more robust. A range of philosophical
arguments is marshalled to support the exclusion of adult children. I make no
apology for quoting these arguments in detail, for they illuminate the way in
which families are conceptualised and, more importantly, they reveal the ideology
underlying the proposals.
(a) The moral argument: “There is a difference between moral duties and legal
duties.”27 The diverse legal obligations of parents end at 16, 18 and 25
years of age, and any obligation to leave an inheritance should not last any
longer. It is considered “anachronistic to continue to make such a duty legally
enforceable”.28
(b) The individualist argument: “The parent’s property is his or her own property:
it is not family property.”29
(c) The freedom argument (which follows logically from an individualist concept
of property): “He should therefore be free to dispose of his property as he
wishes”,30 or again, “It is difficult to see why after they have discharged their
obligation of aliment parents should be unable to dispose of their estate as
they wish”.31 This argument is further refined: “The prospective entitlement
of a spouse or civil partner can be terminated before death by divorce or
dissolution. There is no legal machinery available for parents to dissolve the
parent-adult child relationship so as to prevent their children’s claims.”32
24 See C.(4) below.
25 DP paras 1.3, 1.10, 3.78.
26 Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 124, 1990) paras 3.10, 3.11.
27 DP para 3.95.
28 DP para 3.100.
29 DP para 3.95.
30 DP para 3.95.
31 DP para 3.96.
32 DP para 3.95.
396 the edinburgh law review Vol 12 2008
(d) The legal argument: “Inheritance from a parent should no longer be viewed
as a right.”33 The Commission questions whether such a view would ever have
been justifiable “as no-one has an indefeasible right to succeed to another’s
estate”.34 This is a curious assertion when all Scottish children have had
such a right for centuries, contingent only on the death of a parent and the
existence of moveable assets. Moreover, in jurisprudential terms legal rights
have been characterised as “a paradigm case of ‘having a right’ ”.35 However,
it is now considered time to remove the “legal disability”36 of not being able
to disinherit one’s children.
(e) The capitalist argument: “Compulsory shares for children reflect a static
society where inherited wealth was very important: nowadays there are many
more opportunities for people to amass their own wealth and indeed are
expected to do so.”37 The assumption can, therefore, be made that adult
children “will generally not be in need”. The fact that most people are middle-
aged when their parents die means that “therefore [adult children] are not in
need of substantial capital to set themselves up in life”.38 The implication is
that financial need is the only acceptable rationale for retaining protection for
children and the only acceptable limitation on freedom.
(f ) The pragmatic argument: “legal rights are seldom claimed by adult
children”.39 No allusion is made to the possibility that they are the best-kept
secret in Scots law. All available research data points to the fact that the public
is not well-informed about inheritance issues.40
Taken together, these arguments represent a statement of possessive
individualism, firmly in the liberal tradition. From this foundation emerges a
new version of inheritance law which prioritises the freedom (and rights) of the
individual – as spouse and as property owner – over the claims of kinship. It could
conceivably be characterised as extending the market principles which govern
property transactions into family relationships: the prioritisation of freedom and
33 DP para 3.96.
34 DP para 3.1.
35 N MacCormick, “Discretion and rights” (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 23 at 25.
36 DP para 3.100.
37 DP para 3.100.
38 DP para 3.95.
39 DP para 3.95.
40 K Rowlingson and S McKay, Attitudes to Inheritance in Britain (2005), available at
http://www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/socialpolicy/0385.asp, a study commissioned by the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation (henceforth the Rowntree Report) xii, ch 6; S O’Neill, Wills and Awareness
of Inheritance Rights in Scotland, Scottish Consumer Council (2006), available at http://www.
scotconsumer.org.uk/publications/reports/reports06/rp10wrep.pdf, 13-18; F Wasoff and C Martin,
Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2004: Family Module Report, Scottish Executive Social Research
(2005), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/08/02131208/12092, para 7.9.
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the empowerment of the owner to choose how to dispose of assets, limited only
by pre-existing legal obligations and the need to provide for young dependent
children. Automatic provision for the current spouse fits with this theory in that
a voluntarily assumed relationship can be deemed to represent the choice the
deceased would have made for the disposal of his or her assets.
The transfer of property mortis causa is undoubtedly an economic act.
However, it is based not on market exchange but on relationship and affection.
Inheritance touches both material and sentimental interests41 and the acquisition
of a loved one’s property may have a deeper symbolic function for close
relatives which impacts on the continuity of relationships, memory and even
personal identity.42 The regulation of inheritance, therefore, involves a conceptual
negotiation between the market principle of freedom (of the property owner or
testator) and the non-market (emotional or moral) claims of family members.
This is difficult territory for the law to regulate and, given the diversity of family
life in Scotland, any attempt to formulate rules of general application is likely to
generate controversy. Likewise, strong ideological claims are likely to be disputed
claims. Just as my family may be radically different from yours, so may my version
of justice and freedom. As we shall see, research evidence suggests that the
market model outlined above may not reflect the reality of people’s lives, or the
way in which they conceive of family relationships and inheritance.
Few would question that Scots succession law is in need of reform. There
would be widespread support for the Commission’s view that it is unduly complex
and should take more account of social change and diverse family forms.43 The
question is whether the radical change to the inheritance regime between parents
and children that is proposed in the discussion paper is needed to achieve those
aims. If not, it is suggested that the impetus for change is largely ideological.
C. PROTECTION FROM DISINHERITANCE
(1) Legal tradition
Legal systems have different approaches to inheritance, informed by history and
political and cultural values.44 The Anglo-American tradition prioritises freedom
41 J Beckert, “Political and social interests in the transfer of property” (2005) 46 European Journal of
Sociology 359 at 361-362.
42 J Finch and J Mason, Passing On: Kinship and Inheritance in England (2000) 15ff.
43 DP paras 1.3, 1.8.
44 HWillekens, “Long term developments in family law inWestern Europe: an explanation”, in J Eekelaar
and N Thandabantu (eds), The Changing Family: International Perspectives on the Family and Family
Law (1998) 47; B Willenbacher, “Individualism and traditionalism in inheritance law in Germany,
France, England and the United States” (2003) 28 Journal of Family History 208.
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of testation and only reluctantly interferes with the right of the individual to
distribute assets as he or she sees fit, for property ownership is integral to the
individual’s ability to act as a free agent. One commentator has described the
regulation of inheritance in England as having “a very light touch, by comparison
with most continental jurisdictions”.45 John Stuart Mill encapsulates the Common
Law’s reverence for the freedom of the property owner, both in life and in death:46
bequest is one of the attributes of property: the ownership of a thing cannot be looked
upon as complete without the power of bestowing it, at death or during life, at the
owner’s pleasure.
Most Western European jurisdictions, by contrast, are more prescriptive and
show varying degrees of commitment to the concept of family property. For
instance, both French and German law protect the immediate family through
the twin devices of a community of property regime within marriage and forced
heirship provisions on death.47 The German attitude to testamentary freedom
has been characterised as showing “a deep skepticism against the development of
an unfettered individualism” and reflecting “the (ideological) importance of the
family, conceived as a crucial institution of social organization”.48 In both societies
inheritance is regarded as a family right49 and the rules which govern the process
are embedded in public consciousness.
Scots law, true to its mixed nature, lies somewhere in the middle of these
contrasting traditions. It has no community of property regime, but limits
freedom of testation in the interests of close family members. Stair affirms that
“the first rule of succession in equity, is the express will of the owner”,50 but
this rule is immediately qualified by natural obligations which exist between
husbands and wives and between parents and children, for the man who does
not provide for his own family is “worse than an infidel”.51 The modified rule
is therefore that “the first member of succession in equity must be those of
the defunct’s family, and not those of his institution or choice”.52 Thus it was
not possible to test at all on heritable property until 186853 and, from ancient
45 J Finch, “The State and the family”, in S Cunningham-Burley and L Jamieson (eds), Families and the
State (2003) 29 at 35.
46 J S Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848) book II ch 2 ss 3, 4.
47 For comparative detail see, S van Erp, “New developments in succession law” (2007) 11.3 Electronic
Journal of Comparative Law, available at http://www.ejcl.org.
48 Beckert (n 41) 365 n 4.
49 Willenbacher (n 44) at 209.
50 Inst 3.4.2.
51 Inst 3.4.2, quoting from the Bible (I Tim v 8).
52 Inst 3.4.2
53 W D H Sellar, “Succession law in Scotland – a historical perspective”, in K G C Reid, M J de Waal and
R Zimmermann (eds), Exploring the Law of Succession: Studies National, Historical and Comparative
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times, a married man with a surviving spouse and children could only test on
one-third of his moveable property.54 This rule is preserved in modern Scots
law, for children and spouses can still claim legal rights on up to two-thirds of
the deceased’s moveable property.55 However, whilst legal rights may resemble
a Civilian forced heirship entitlement, in practice they do not operate as such.
The person on the Parismétro is likely to be well-informed about the distribution
of the réserve, which does exactly what it says – it is automatically reserved for
the réservataires and cannot be avoided.56 Legal rights, by contrast, are not
reserved in this way. Although legal rights vest at the moment of death, they
are not routinely distributed.57 Of course, they may be claimed by the relatives
in question, but such a claim presupposes knowledge of the entitlement and,
perhaps more significantly, risks upsetting the provisions of the deceased’s will
and causing family disputes at a difficult time.
By proposing that the legal rights of children be removed, the discussion paper
re-orientates Scots law towards the Anglo-American approach. It does not yet
envisage an entirely unfettered individualism, but by giving automatic protection
only to the current relationship of choice58 it comes closer to that model than
at any time in the history of Scots law. Change is not necessarily a bad thing,
of course, nor tradition good, but the impetus towards greater individualism
in family relationships may be anachronistic. It is certainly at odds with the
tone of current political dialogue with its emphasis on family and community
obligations as the foundations of civic responsibility and its call for increased
intergenerational support. Gordon Brown, for example, has said:59
People – over the life cycle from the cradle to the grave – helped in childhood, helping
in youth and adulthood, helping again – and helped in old age – reciprocity across the
generations –making a reality of Burke’s definition of society as “a partnership extended
over time”.
(2007) 49 at 60; but see also G L Gretton, “Fideicommissary substitutions: Scots law in historical and
comparative perspective”, in Exploring the Law of Succession 156 at 164 n 43.
54 Sellar (n 53) at 60.
55 For the history of legal rights, see: J C Gardner, The Origin and Nature of the Legal Rights of Spouses
and Children in the Scottish Law of Succession (1928); A E Anton, “The effect of marriage upon
property in Scots law” (1956) 19 MLR 653; Sellar (n 53) at 57-66.
56 H Dyson, French Property and Inheritance Law: Principles and Practice (2003) ch 28.
57 Research carried out by the author suggests that claims for legal rights are now regarded by the legal
profession as exceptional. In a recent questionnaire survey (to which 73 Scottish law firms responded)
68% of respondents, all of whom were experienced executry practitioners, had not encountered a
testate estate in which legal rights had been claimed and a further 28% had only encountered this
situation once or twice.
58 As well as spouses and civil partners, cohabitants’ rights are also extended: see DP paras 3.63-3.75.
59 Speech to National Council for Voluntary Organisations, Feb 2000, available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/speeches/chancellorexchequer/speech_chex_90200.cfm.
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(2) Individualism and kinship
The view that British (and western) society is becoming more individualised,
selfish and consumer-orientated is widely touted. In an important research study
of attitudes to inheritance in England, Finch and Mason question some of the
social theory analysis prevalent in the 1990s60 whose dominant narrative was of
family breakdown and the emergence of the “individualised society”.61 Finch and
Mason explicitly distance themselves from a definition of individualism which
“means not just that each person is the centre of his or her own world but
also that this is how it should be. There is a legitimacy about being ego-centred
that is a requirement of contemporary living.”62 Arguably this is the world view
encapsulated in the Scottish Law Commission’s ideological framework.
In their study Finch andMason examined attitudes to inheritance in interviews
with around 100 adults and found evidence suggesting a different picture, one
which pointed to “more connected, more relational, forms of social existence”.63
The researchers redefine individualism as “relationism”, by which they mean
that freedom of choice is evident in the way in which people construct their
kin relationships. A “family” is a flexible concept, one that is constituted on the
basis of individual relationships rather than generated automatically by family
positions. For instance, a person may be closer to a particular sister, aunt or cousin
(because of who they are) rather than the person’s siblings as a whole (because
of the mere fact of relationship). However, within a framework constructed by
choice, the evidence suggests that kin relationships and commitments are still
central to people’s lives. Families do not appear to have disintegrated and most
people still want to think that they belong to a functional kin group.64 Within
this flexible and dynamic picture of how families work, the researchers found
consensus:65
The core thread of fixity is the continuing relationship between parents and children.
This remains at the core even in complex families . . . the parent-child relationship is
both predictable and privileged, as is seen very clearly in relation to inheritance.
60 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 8-9, 17-22.
61 U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) 135, quoted in Finch & Mason, Passing On
(n 42) 8.
62 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 21.
63 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 22, App A. Although this was an English study, it is unlikely that
the results would be substantially different in Scotland. The Rowntree Report (n 40) was in respect
of a UK-wide study and found no difference in attitudes to inheritance among Scottish participants.
Professor Rowlingson has confirmed to the author that the Scottish sample was particularly scrutinised
as the researchers were aware that Scots law operated differently, but no attitudinal differences were
identified.
64 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 7; Finch (n 45) at 33-36.
65 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 59.
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Moreover, people do not distinguish between young and adult children: “it is
expected that children will form part of ‘the family’ at whatever age or point in
the life course. But everything else can and does change.”66
Finch and Mason also found that the vast majority of parents wanted to
leave something to their children. There was strong support for being able to
use property in whatever way one chooses during life, but for most people
being a good parent included passing something on to the next generation.67
These findings suggest that the relationship between parents and children is
fundamentally important to the way in which most people view inheritance.
The Rowntree Report, the most recent research into British attitudes to
inheritance,68 found that inheritance was no longer perceived to be the preserve
of the rich. 90% of respondents, selected from a broad socio-demographic range,
saw themselves as potential bequeathers.69 When this group was asked about who
they would leave their wealth to, the vast majority (89%) identified children.70
Support for what the researchers call “intergenerational solidarity” and for the
idea of leaving an inheritance for future generations was strongest amongst the
oldest participants, Asian and black respondents, and – unsurprisingly – parents,
including single parents. It was weakest amongst “babyboomers” in their 50s
who had no children.71 Age and parenthood appear to be significant indicators
in attitudes towards inheritance and as people age and become more dependent
themselves their sense of generational solidarity may increase.
Whilst most people value individualism and freedom of choice, for parents an
even higher value is placed on their relationship with their children, whether
young or old. That kin relationship may assume even greater importance in
reconstituted families in the aftermath of a marriage or civil partnership which has
failed.72 Research suggests, therefore, that the parent-child relationship remains
central to public conceptions of inheritance and that it has little to do with need.
(3) Moral and legal obligations
The discussion paper is anxious to separate moral from legal territory.
Accordingly, it proposes that only legal obligations of parents should be
recognised in inheritance and, furthermore, that the public purse should look
66 Finch (n 45) at 41.
67 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 115, 123-125.
68 2008 adults were interviewed, including a representative sample of Scottish participants.
69 Rowntree Report (n 40) 35.
70 Rowntree Report 48.
71 Rowntree Report 40-44.
72 B Dimmock et al, “Intergenerational relationship among stepfamilies in the UK”, in S Harper (ed),
Families in Ageing Societies (2004) 82 at 93.
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after adult children: “The obligation to relieve the needs of adult children rests
on the state not the parent’s estate”.73 However, within many, if not most,
families, research studies have found an “implicit contract”74 which operates in a
reciprocal way: children attend to elderly parents; parents care for and support
their children, even into adulthood. Indeed, the parental obligation has been
characterised as a “no exit” obligation75 in modern society, one which involves
both emotional and financial sacrifice. Such obligations within families may be
unspoken, even taken for granted, and whilst need may be a factor, particularly
with the very young and the very old, it will rarely be the source of the obligation.
Finch and Mason found a high degree of consensus about what was “the proper
thing to do” in parent-child relationships76 and a strong sense of duty independent
of any legal obligation.
To take a problem current in all western democracies, the ageing population,
commentators have noted the policy shift, from all sides of the political spectrum,
away from what is perceived to be an over-reliance on the welfare state to
what has been described as the “welfare society”.77 Rodger describes the
increasing evidence of a “ ‘moral agenda’ shaping debate about the distribution
of responsibility for social welfare between the state, the individual and the
family”.78 The political imperative, which appears to run directly counter to the
Scottish Law Commission’s “statist” model of adult welfare, is to transfer social
care from the public realm to the private sphere of voluntary organisations,
families and other informal carers.79 Harper’s work on the elderly demonstrates
the way in which family obligations of care and support have become integral to
UK government policy.80
The political rhetoric of personal responsibility (“no rights without
responsibilities” or “helping people to help themselves”) is commonplace,
evidence of an ongoing redefinition of social citizenship:81
73 DP para 3.95.
74 RHancock et al, Attitudes to Inheritance (2002) 7; see also J Finch and JMason, “Obligations of kinship
in contemporary Britain: is there normative agreement?” (1991) 42 British Journal of Sociology 345 at
356-359; J Finch and J Mason, Negotiating Family Responsibilities (1993) 18-21.
75 A L Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe their Children and What Society Owes Parents (2004) 51-52.
76 J Finch and J Mason, “Filial obligations and kin support for elderly people” (1990) 10 Ageing and
Society 151 at 153-160.
77 J Rodger, From a Welfare State to a Welfare Society: The Changing Context of Social Policy in a
Postmodern Era (2003).
78 J Rodger, “Family life, moral regulation and the state: social steering and the personal sphere”, in S
Cunningham-Burley and L Jamieson (eds), Families and the State (2003) 47.
79 Rodger (n 78) at 51.
80 SHarper, Ageing Societies (2006) 190-191; also AWalker, “Intergenerational relations and the provision
of welfare”, in A Walker (ed), The New Generational Contract (1996) 25; Finch (n 45) at 30.
81 Rodger (n 78) at 57.
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The emerging family discourse from the right has become increasingly strident and
marked by a vocabulary which talks of responsibilities and obligations rather than social
rights, a view which has gained ascendancy on the centre left as well.
This idea has the advantage of being both socially and economically attractive – if
families look after their own, the public purse is saved some of the expense of
health and social care.82 The change has impacted most on women. It is estimated
that informal care of the elderly by (usually female) family members is the largest
care sector.83 Figures suggest that as much as 80% of elderly care in the UK
comes from family members,84 and even in reconstituted families the “dominant
care relationship” is that of “blood-related daughter for mother”.85
Whatever the intrinsic merits of this policy shift, it is clear that the family
retains some of the welfare functions it was solely responsible for in an earlier
era, functions which are willingly assumed by many adult children:86
Despite the growth in . . . individualistic values, there remains a consistent body of
evidence that many families remain committed to care and support their kin in terms
of expressed attitudes and behaviour.
It is arguably inconsistent for policy makers, on the one hand, to be
encouraging the assumption of family responsibilities as part of a citizenship
agenda and, on the other, for law reformers to be advocating the transfer of those
responsibilities to the state once a child has reached adulthood. Not only is this
position at odds with current social policy, it is also at odds with the moral sense
which researchers have consistently found in people’s attitudes. Moreover, there
is a potential inconsistency in the application of this principle in the discussion
paper, for while adult children are deemed to be the responsibility of the state,
adult spouses are worthy recipients of inheritance on the basis, presumably, of
need; yet the rules will apply regardless of whether the children are poor and the
spouse rich or vice versa.
The attempt to put clear blue water between the realms of law and morality
is problematic, not least because the very attempt to do so in itself represents
a particular moral position. Instead of presenting a dichotomy between moral
and legal obligations, it may be more helpful to recognise that where there is
consistency in social behaviour and consensus in public attitudes, taken together
82 Walker (n 80) at 32-33; Harper, Ageing Societies (n 80) 190-197.
83 M Knapp et al, “Social care for older people: the growth of independent-sector provision in the UK”,
in S Harper (ed), Families in Ageing Societies (2004) 144; Harper, Ageing Societies (n 80) 27, 195-197.
84 Walker (n 80) at 3; Harper, Ageing Societies (n 80) 196.
85 S Harper, “The challenge for families of demographic ageing”, in S Harper (ed), Families in Ageing
Societies 26; Dimmock (n 72) at 88.
86 Walker (n 80) at 1; Harper, Ageing Societies (n 80) 195-196.
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these constitute social norms. It is perhaps a reasonable expectation that the law
should not diverge too far from those norms or from the reality of most people’s
lives.87
(4) Public opinion
In its assessment of the merits of children’s inheritance rights, the Scottish Law
Commission relied on the results of opinion surveys which it commissioned in
1986 and in 2005. Participants in both surveys were asked to give their views
on a series of fictional scenarios involving the disinheritance of various family
members.
In the 1986 survey88 there was clear support for children (whose ages were
not specified) to receive an inheritance despite the existence of a will attempting
to disinherit them, except where the will was in favour of the spouse.89 In the
2005 survey,90 support was even stronger. 87% of respondents agreed that young
children should have a claim on a man’s estate where he had left them out of
his will, and 70% agreed that adult children should have a similar claim, rising to
77% where the will favoured one child to the exclusion of another.91 Where the
will was in favour of a wife, support for children’s claim was less strong: a small
majority (54%) considered that the children should be entitled to some of the
estate, and 40% thought that the will should stand.
The 2005 survey suggests that there is strong support for a fixed share of
a deceased’s estate to pass to children of any age, although weaker where the
will is in favour of the spouse. However, the survey did not ask some important
questions, such as whether respondents would feel differently if the deceased
was poor or wealthy. The earlier survey used this distinction in several questions
and found that the size of the estate elicited different responses, suggesting that
the public is able to make subtle distinctions on the basis of what is available to
be claimed.92 Another significant question would be to assess support for the
87 For a helpful analysis of moral, legal and social duties within families, see J Eekelaar, “Are parents
morally obliged to care for their children?”, in J Eekelaar and P Sarcevic (eds), Parenthood in Modern
Society (1993).
88 992 people aged 18 and over were sampled. For a summary of the findings, see Intestate Succession
and Legal Rights (Scot Law Com CM No 69, 1986) app II (henceforth 1986 survey).
89 1986 survey (n 88) 233-234. Support was 85% where everything was left to a charity, decreasing to 80%
where it had been left to one child at the expense of the other. Only 40% supported claims of children
where everything had been left to a spouse.
90 Attitudes Towards Succession Law: Findings of a Scottish Omnibus Survey, Scottish Executive
(2005) (henceforth 2005 survey), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/07/
18151328/13297.1008 people aged 16 and over were sampled.
91 2005 survey (n 90) paras 2.18, 2.21, 2.28.
92 1986 survey (n 88) 227-231.
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claims of children where the will was in favour of a second spouse who was
not their parent. It should be noted that in every scenario where respondents
were given a choice of opting for either a fixed share or a discretionary share
requiring application to the court, they chose the former.93 There was no evidence
whatsoever that the public would support the involvement of the courts in
assessing the merits of an inheritance claim.
The evidence from opinion surveys suggests that Scots do not support
unfettered freedom of testation. There is clearly support for an automatic share to
go to a spouse, but also strong support for the rights of children. There is little to
suggest that Scottish parents would consider themselves currently under a “legal
disability” in being unable to disinherit their children.
(5) The demise of legal rights
In summary, research studies and public opinion surveys show convincingly that
children are important beneficiaries in the inheritance story which most people
tell and that the Scottish public supports the retention of “the bairns’ part” in
some form for children of all ages. The proposal to remove legitim appears to
ignore significant evidence which might inform the law-making process and may
also be moving in a direction which is at odds with current social policy.
D. THE RULES OF INTESTACY
Much of the evidence already examined is equally relevant to the rules of
intestacy, particularly in light of the Scottish Law Commission’s explicit desire
to take account of both public opinion and testator behaviour, for intestacy rules
should “by and large mirror the provisions for their family that people usually
make in their wills”.94 The broad thrust of the reform proposals is to re-orientate
family entitlements so as to prioritise spouses over other family members. The
ideological underpinning is thus similar to the one adopted for disinheritance.
Where the deceased had both a surviving spouse and children, the proposal
is to transfer to the spouse the first £300,000 of the estate, and to share any
remaining balance equally between the spouse and children.95 However, since
HMRC figures show that less than 6% of estates are likely to be worth more than
93 2005 survey (n 90) paras 2.16, 2.19, 2.22, 2.29, 2.32, 2.35, 2.38, 2.41.
94 DP para 2.2.
95 DP para 2.57. Dependent children will have a claim for aliment or, if the spouse is a stepparent, can
apply to the court for a discretionary award: see DP para 2.69.
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£300,000 in the whole of the UK,96 the claims of Scottish children on intestacy
will be limited to this small minority of estates.
The “spouse-takes-virtually-everything” rule97 is not so controversial within
a nuclear family model, for most children would accept a postponement of
inheritance until the death of their second parent. The same is not true within
reconstituted families. On an estate of less than £300,000, children of a first
marriage will be unlikely ever to inherit if their living parent remarries and dies
intestate.98 The removal of legitim combined with the effective removal of their
entitlement on intestacy creates a “double whammy” effect for Scottish adult
children.99 There is little consideration of the effect these changes could have
on family relationships or the potential for future family conflict which they
represent.
Other recent changes to succession law have also impacted on children’s
intestacy claims. When it created discretionary rights for cohabitants,100 the
Scottish Parliament made a policy choice that such a claim should not interfere
with the succession rights of a, presumably estranged, spouse, but that it should
rank above those of the deceased’s children. The discussion paper proposes an
even more radical shift in the allocation between spouse and children.
(1) Public opinion
In the 1986 survey respondents were asked for their views on the allocation of
the intestate estate of a man survived by his wife and two adult children. Support
for giving all to the surviving spouse decreased from 65% if the husband was
poor, to 51% if he was neither poor nor wealthy, to 38% if he was wealthy.101 The
public strongly supported the “all-to-spouse” rule only in a situation of poverty,
with weak support even for medium-sized estates. It is not, therefore, accurate
to claim that the public supports an intestacy entitlement by children “only
. . . when the deceased left a substantial estate”.102 In the 2005 survey, support
for the “all-to-spouse” proposal was weaker. More people disagreed with it (47%)
than supported it (46%).103 It is important to note that these survey findings are
96 Figures for 2004-5 covering all estates notified for “probate” (including confirmed Scottish estates): see
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/inheritance_tax/07ir123.pdf.
97 K McK Norrie, “Reforming succession law: intestate succession” (2007) 12 EdinLR 77 at 80.
98 Norrie (n 97) at 77.
99 This possibility is recognised by the Scottish Law Commission: see DP para 2.41.
100 Family Law (Scotland) Act s 29.
101 1986 survey (n 88) 227.
102 DP para 2.37.
103 2005 survey (n 90) para 2.6.
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predicated upon a family scenario where there is a surviving spouse and adult
children.
The 2005 survey proposed an alternative scenario in which a surviving spouse
would be entitled to a fixed sum, the balance of the estate to be shared equally
between spouse and children. 67% of respondents supported this proposition
and the discussion paper relies on this finding to support its current proposal.
However, this interpretation of the data is questionable. Since no details were
given either about the amount of the fixed sum or the amount of the estate
in question, how reliable is public support? For instance, would 67% of the
sample support the proposition that a spouse should inherit all of an estate
worth £300,000? Would there be more support for the spouse to inherit, say,
£100,000 plus a proportion of the balance? More detail in the question and more
differentiation in the range of responses are required for there to be any reliable
gauge of public opinion. On the available evidence, it is questionable if there is
public support for the proposition that children should only inherit on intestacy in
very substantial estates, and yet the proposed figure of £300,000 would certainly
produce that result.
(2) Testator behaviour
Since there is little doubt that most spouses104 leave the majority, if not all, of
their wealth to their surviving spouse, it appears reasonable for the Commission
to propose rules of intestacy which reflect that pattern. In a government survey
of 1000 estates conducted in 2000–2001, 80% of the estates of married men
and 70% of the estates of married women went to their spouse.105 Research on
Scottish estates confirms a similar pattern for married people106 and within most
nuclear families, this would be the expectation. It has, however, been suggested
that inter-spousal transfers are not regarded as inheritance at all:107
People do not think that property passing to a spouse constitutes inheritance. Passing
on one’s property is thought of as predominantly transmission to the next generation.
Finch and Mason conclude that inter-spousal transfer is regarded as a separate
process “with its own logic”, based on the assumption that property is held in
104 As no research is available on testator patterns for civil partners, discussion is limited to married
people.
105 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/inheritance_tax/table12_9.pdf.
106 M Munro, “Housing wealth and inheritance” (1988) 17 Journal of Social Policy 417; H E Jones,
Succession Law, Scottish Office Central Research Unit Papers (1990) 27.
107 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 70-71, 174. This, of course, is an interpretation given by the
researchers which was not explicitly addressed with participants. Further research would be needed
in order to assess whether this represented public opinion more broadly.
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common within a marriage.108 Inheritance to the next generation is postponed
while the second parent is alive, but there is nevertheless a widespread
expectation that children will inherit in due course.109
A study of Scottish wills suggests that the initial transfer of property between
spouses is “a temporary and transitional stage”, for the expectation is that wealth
will flow on the death of the second spouse to the next generation.110 However,
this is only accurate “if each individual is assumed to form a single, lifetime
partnership”,111 an assumption which can no longer be made. Reconstituted
families are not yet the norm, but are an increasingly significant proportion of
the Scottish population. The intestacy proposals may have unanticipated effects
within these families.
Finch and Mason found that interviewees who belonged to complex families
made clear distinctions between first and second marriages in that property
bequeathed to a second spouse often came with conditions attached because of
commitments to children.112 Divorce was not in itself a problem, for it did not
“disturb the balance between the claims of a spouse and the claims of children”.
The real difficulty arose on remarriage because that presented the possibility
that people who did not know the deceased might in the end inherit his or her
money.113 The researchers identify as a dominant theme of their research people’s
desire to avoid wealth passing out of the family:114
[T]he position of children is guarded jealously, particularly against the possibility
that resources might pass to someone with only a distant connection through second
marriage . . . It is not merely that children lose out. It is also that resources pass to
someone who has no real connection, either genetic or personal, and who has not been,
nor would have been, chosen by the testator.
These findings suggest that a more sophisticated approach is needed to take
account of family circumstances. Although statistics suggest that property is most
commonly bequeathed to a spouse, none of the available data has specifically
examined wills involving a second spouse and children of a previous marriage.
Finch and Mason’s study strongly indicates that inheritance patterns would be
different in those circumstances.
This is borne out by the 1986 Scottish opinion survey. In a scenario where
a married man is survived by a second wife and adult children of a previous
108 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 71.
109 Rowntree Report (n 40) 7-11.
110 Munro (n 106) at 432.
111 Munro (n 106) at 432.
112 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 58.
113 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 33, 35.
114 Finch & Mason, Passing On (n 42) 60.
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marriage, the researchers conclude that the introduction of the second marriage
“had a considerable bearing on attitudes”115 and increased support for children to
share in the estate. Even where the man was very poor, only 32% of respondents
thought the wife should have the whole estate, decreasing to 19% for a moderate
estate and 12% for a wealthy man.116 This question was not repeated in the
later 2005 survey. However, the latter did ask if the stepchildren of a man who
has been married twice should inherit from his estate on intestacy. A majority
of respondents (75%)117 thought they should. It seems reasonable to suppose
that support for a man’s natural children to receive a share on intestacy would be
even greater.
The discussion paper acknowledges the difficulties of creating rules for
reconstituted families118 but the final proposal adopts the same rule for all without
distinction. Simplicity is no doubt a laudable objective for law reform,119 but
it may not be a sufficiently compelling one if the end result fails to reflect
the nuances of public opinion. The complex territory of reconstituted families
may require complex law, as is demonstrated by the rules adopted by other
jurisdictions.120
(3) Intestacy and reconstituted families
The discussion paper conducts a brief comparative survey and concludes that
other legal systems have “widely differing solutions” to balancing the interests of a
spouse and children on intestacy.121 There are, however, a number of identifiable
patterns. In some (mostly Common Law) countries, the spouse receives a larger
proportion than the children, whose interest is deferred while the spouse is
alive, often by giving the spouse a liferent or usufruct. In other (mainly Civilian)
jurisdictions, the spouse receives less than children as an “inheritance”, but this is
accompanied by a matrimonial property regime in which the spouse is already
a co-owner. However, all jurisdictions surveyed recognise that the transfer of
property to the next generation is an important goal of inheritance law and they
are united in their attempts, however imperfect, to deal with the difficulties
inherent in complex families. In 1989, the UK government rejected an all-to-
the-spouse rule for England and Wales on the grounds that it failed to protect
115 1986 survey (n 88) 228.
116 1986 survey (n 88) 228.
117 2005 survey (n 90) paras 2.10-2.11.
118 DP para 2.70.
119 DP para 2.46.
120 DP paras 2.30-2.36, 2.41-2.45, 2.47.
121 DP para 2.30.
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children of a first marriage.122 If the Scottish Law Commission’s proposals were
to be adopted, Scots law would be in the unique position of failing to allow those
children to claim on a parent’s estate.
The Commission recognises the impact of divorce, cohabitation and
stepfamilies on the shape of Scottish society123 but there is little concession to
those factors other than an extension of the claims of cohabitants.124 Despite
estimates suggesting that stepfamilies will be the norm in the UK by 2010,125 and
despite strong public support for their inclusion in any inheritance,126 the reform
proposals exclude stepchildren.127 However, the current proposals may have the
indirect effect of stepchildren inheriting everything in a reconstituted family in
which the parents die intestate.
To illustrate, take a fictional family consisting of Diana and Charles and their
two sons. Diana dies. Her estate is worth £150,000 so that, under the proposals,
it all passes to Charles (the boys could only claim if her estate was worth more
than £300,000). At this point the sons are happy for their father to inherit their
mother’s assets. Charles subsequently marries Camilla, who has two daughters
from a previous marriage. Charles and Camilla pool their resources, including
Charles’ inherited wealth, and jointly purchase a new home with expensive
furnishings. Charles later dies intestate leaving an estate which is valued at
£250,000 and Camilla inherits all, a fact which creates a degree of unease within
the family. However, when Camilla later dies (intestate), her blood relatives
(the girls) inherit all since stepchildren (the boys) have no inheritance rights.
Charles’ wider family is now deeply aggrieved. Had Camilla died first leaving an
estate equal in value to Charles’, Charles would have inherited all and the boys
would be the lucky beneficiaries on his death, to the exclusion of Camilla’s girls.
The allocation of assets within this fictional family demonstrates the effects of the
current proposals. Depending on the arbitrary order of death of the parents, the
blood relatives of the last surviving spouse will inherit all.
These are difficult issues and the easy answer is that parents should make a
will. However, it is a fact that the majority of Scots have not done so and the rules
of intestacy must therefore attempt to balance the interests of the survivors in a
way that is “fair and rational”.128 In my view the current proposals fail to do so.
122 DP para 2.35.
123 DP para 1.3.
124 This is an extension of the current discretionary claim on intestacy to testate estates: see DP para 3.75.
125 O’Neill, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights (n 40) 3; 2005 survey (n 90) 7-8.
126 2005 survey (n 90) 12-13. Research suggests that the most important factor in attitudes to the inclusion
of stepchildren is the extent to which the child was brought up by the stepparent: see Finch &Mason,
Passing On (n 42) 47.
127 DP paras 2.73-2.80.
128 DP para 2.2.
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(4) The impact of the intestacy rules
In fairness to the Scottish Law Commission, it should be recognised that its
proposals are merely an extension of the current rules of intestacy. Throughout
Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, the inheritance rights of
widows were significantly improved at the expense of blood relatives.129 The
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 was Scotland’s contribution to this process and
was in its time an innovative and socially responsive piece of legislation. It created
prior rights for a surviving spouse,130 so that the imaginary widow (although the
Act is gender-neutral) would have a roof over her head, furniture in the home
and some money to live on. However, while recognising that spouses required
increased protection, the Act was careful to balance that imperative with the
claims of an intestate’s children. The spouse’s prior rights are, therefore, the first
claim on an intestate estate, followed by the legal rights131 of spouse and children,
after which any remaining balance goes to children under section 2 of the Act.
Up until 2005, the spouse was likely to inherit all of a modest estate and the
children would benefit most in a larger estate. However, in 2005 that balance
was significantly altered when the values of prior rights changed. In particular,
the housing element of prior rights was dramatically increased from £130,000 to
£300,000.132 It is instructive to inquire how this figure was arrived at.
An investigation of the background to the relevant statutory instrument reveals
that the Executive originally intended the housing increase to be a modest
one, from £130,000 to £160,000, plus an increase in the monetary claim from
£58,000 to £70,000 if the deceased left no children. However, “the Succession
Committee of the Law Society of Scotland did not consider these increases to
be substantial enough and recommended the values of £300,000 and £75,000 be
used, respectively”.133 The reasons for the Law Society’s recommended increase
are not explained, but it was not objected to134 and on that basis, the Subordinate
Legislation Committee determined that the attention of the Scottish Parliament
129 M A Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law (1989) 238.
130 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 ss 8-9. However, unlike many European countries, Scottish prior rights
only arise on intestacy and therefore can only be described as a “generous provision” (E M Clive, The
Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, 4th edn (1997) para 14.018) in that limited context.
131 After satisfaction of prior rights, legal rights can be claimed on any remaining moveable estate, one
third being due to the spouse and one third to the children.
132 Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse (Scotland) Order 2005, SSI 2005/252. The furniture and plenishings
right rose only from £22,000 to £24,000 and the monetary payment from £35,000 to £42,000 if the
deceased had children and from £58,000 to £75,000 if there were no children.
133 Full text of a note by the clerk to the Justice 1 Committee is available at http://
www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/justice1/papers-05/j1p05-18.pdf.
134 By either the Scottish Courts Service or Help the Aged, the other two bodies consulted by the
Executive.
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need not be drawn to the instrument.135 Since the average net value of heritable
property in the whole of the UK was less than £153,000,136 the Executive’s initial
figure of £160,000 would arguably have been more appropriate. Even though the
housing right is rarely claimed in full,137 the increase to £300,000 has the potential
to make a significant impact on the division of an estate and on the amount
available for children. Yet this change was subject to no public consultation, no
Parliamentary debate and no media scrutiny.138
The current discussion paper has chosen the figure of £300,000 as the spouse’s
fixed share by analogy with the current entitlement to prior rights plus legal rights,
recognising that the maximum value of prior rights is rarely claimed.139 However,
by applying this amount across the whole estate regardless of its composition, the
result will be the exclusion of an even greater number of children.
The reform proposals aim explicitly to ensure that the spouse will inherit all of
a “modest” estate, and that children should be entitled to “a reasonable (but not
disproportionately large) share” of a “substantial” estate.140 This raises two further
questions. First, is it appropriate to define a substantial estate as one worth more
than £300,000? Secondly, for whom should the rules of intestacy be designed?
(a) What constitutes a substantial estate?
Official statistics show that for the year 2003–4 the average estate notified for
probate141 in the whole of the UK was worth £166,627.142 The most recent
statistics available for Scotland143 show that in the year to December 2007,
135 Subordinate Legislation Committee, 20th Report, 2005 (Session 2), available at http://www.scottish.
parliament.uk/business/committees/subleg/reports-05/sur05-20-01.htm.
136 £152,898 for the year 2003-4 (the most recent figures available): see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
stats/inheritance_tax/07ir124_200304.pdf. The average value of moveable assets was £77,902.
137 For instance if a couple co-owns a house worth £500,000 which is subject to a standard security of
£200,000 in joint names, the deceased’s relevant interest (Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 s 8(6)) will
only amount to £150,000.
138 In Northern Ireland, where house prices are broadly similar to Scotland, the Department of
Finance and Personnel conducted a recent consultation on the appropriate amount for the statutory
legacy available to a surviving spouse on intestacy. It was considered appropriate to set the
value at £200,000 where the deceased had children and £300,000 where the deceased had no
children: see Administration of Estates: Intestacy and the Statutory Legacy (2007), available at
http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/statutory_legacy_executive_summary-2.pdf.
139 DP para 2.50.
140 DP para 2.49.
141 This includes confirmed estates in Scotland.
142 See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/inheritance_tax/07ir124_200304.pdf (all estates reported before 1
July 2007 for the financial year 2003-4).
143 Statistics provided by the Scottish Court Service under a Freedom of Information Act request made
by the author. These figures represent all confirmed estates, which the Scottish Consumer Council
estimates to be around half of all estates. See O’Neill, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights
Vol 12 2008 from the cradle to the grave 413
the average Scottish estate was worth £147,822.144 In the largest population
centres, Glasgow and Edinburgh, the average estate was respectively £127,951
and £199,619. It is clear from these figures that the average estate is well below
the £300,000 figure selected as the fixed share to be given to a surviving spouse on
intestacy. It can safely be concluded that in the vast majority of cases the surviving
spouse will take the whole estate under the new proposals and only the children
of the wealthiest Scots will have a claim on an intestate estate. To select a figure
which is more than double the national average as the surviving spouse’s share
is to equate “substantial” with “unusually wealthy” in the context of the Scottish
population.
(b) For whom should intestacy rules be designed?
Despite the increase in the amount of property the average person owns, it is still
the case that most Scots have not made a will. This may, however, be misleading
in that the likelihood of making a will increases with age with the result that only
a minority (albeit substantial) of Scots is likely to die intestate.145 Recent research
found that only 37% of Scottish people had made a will, but rising to 69% of those
aged 65 or over.146 The most recent statistics indicate that 31% of those who died
in 2007 were intestate.147
Who is likely to die intestate? O’Neill found a strong correlation between
property ownership and will-making: homeowners, now around two-thirds of
Scottish householders,148 were six times more likely to have made a will than non-
homeowners. Social class is also a significant factor in that those in professional
and managerial jobs are five times more likely to have made a will than the rest
of the population.149 Intestate estates are also likely to be smaller. In 1986-7 the
(n 40) 19 n 23; Jones, Succession Law (n 106) para 2.3. Even taking into account the effect of joint
bank accounts and special destinations, it may be a further research question to establish why the
confirmation figures are so low.
144 I have excluded from these figures one unusually large estate in Selkirk (c £320 million) since it
significantly distorted the average. The average small estate (currently up to £30,000: see Confirmation
to Small Estates (Scotland) Order 2005, SSI 2005/251) is £10,032 and the average ordinary estate is
£196,623.
145 Jones, Succession Law (n 106) paras 1.2-1.4.
146 O’Neill, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights (n 40) 5. This trend is also confirmed by the
Rowntree Report (n 40) 71.
147 Statistics provided by the Scottish Court Service for confirmed estates, again with the caveat that they
represent around half of all deaths.
148 Scotland’s People: Annual Report – Results from the 2005 Scottish Household Survey (2006), available
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/08/03090800/0, 23-26.
149 O’Neill, Wills and Awareness of Inheritance Rights (n 40) 7, 20.
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value of intestate estates was less than half the value of testate estates.150 Scots
who are wealthy, who own heritable property and who belong to the professional
and managerial classes are therefore least in need of the rules of intestacy.
Under reference to four worked examples, the discussion paper claims that the
figure of £300,000 “was chosen to ensure that most estates would be divided fairly
between spouse or civil partner and issue”.151 Two of these examples are based
on an estate worth over £1 million, a third is worth £366,000. Indeed, many of
the examples used in the discussion paper appear to be untypical.152 Despite the
recognition that most intestate estates are modest,153 the Law Commission has
sought also to accommodate the small number of substantial intestate estates.154
“Injustice would be likely to result”, it is said, “if the ‘all to surviving spouse or
civil spouse’ rule appropriate for small and modest estates were to be applied to
substantial estates.”155
To meet the stated objective of being “fair and rational”,156 the rules for intes-
tacy should arguably cater for small to modest estates or alternatively for average
estates, on the basis of statistical evidence. There would undoubtedly still be
winners and losers, but there would also be a rational justification for the figures
selected. The statistics speak for themselves. 89% of Scottish estates confirmed
in 2007 had a net value of less than £300,000, i.e. only 11% of all estates would be
above the proposed limit.157 However, once separated into testate and intestate
categories,158 the effects of the intestacy proposals become clear: 85% of testate
estates and 98% of intestate estates were worth less than £300,000. Applying the
proposals to estates confirmed in 2007 demonstrates that only 2% of intestate
estates would devolve on anyone other than the surviving spouse.
E. A TENTATIVE SUGGESTION: MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
A surprising omission from the discussion paper is any consideration of a
matrimonial property regime for inheritance law. Scotland’s institutional writers
150 Jones, Succession Law (n 106) 15 (table 2), para 4.14. More recent averages for testate and intestate
estates were not available from the Scottish Court Service.
151 DP para 2.54.
152 An earlier proposal (DP para 2.15) used an example based on an estate worth £1.25 million, which is
perhaps unhelpful in trying to illustrate the injustice of an outcome which allocated to the unfortunate
widow no less than £674,000.
153 DP para 2.38.
154 DP para 2.38.
155 DP para 2.38.
156 DP para 2.2.
157 All statistics for 2007 provided by the Scottish Court Service.
158 69% (18,435) of all confirmed estates were testate and 31% (8,357) were intestate.
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considered a wife’s jus relictae to derive from a “communion of goods” between a
married couple159 and appeals for the resurrection of the concept have appeared
from time to time.160 In its 1986 consultative memorandum the Scottish Law
Commission recognised that, historically, legal rights reflected some form of
community of property and that such a principle was still relevant. Indeed,
the proposals for a spouse to claim a fixed share of the estate as legal rights
were justified at that time “on matrimonial property principles”.161 The desire
in the current discussion paper to give spouses a much greater proportion of
the deceased’s property acknowledges the same principle but stops short of
recognising common ownership.
It is particularly disappointing that the Commission has retreated from a
matrimonial property regime given the potential opportunity to bring inheritance
into line with divorce law. A community of acquests principle has been in
operation for divorcing couples since 1985, i.e. a presumption of equal sharing
in assets acquired during the marriage with exceptions for gifts, inheritance and
property previously owned by either party.162 The adoption of a similar regime for
inheritance could shortcut current efforts to prioritise a spouse’s entitlement on
death. The 1986 consultative memorandum admitted that “it would be anomalous
to recognise [a spouse’s claims on matrimonial property] on divorce but not on
death”,163 but it was felt that a community of acquests rule was too complicated
for inheritance law where “a simpler, more rough and ready, rule may be called
for”.164
Twenty years on, the divorce regime is now familiar territory both for courts
and lawyers and it is largely uncontroversial that the law can disregard ownership
or title in the reallocation of assets between couples. There is already a statutory
presumption of co-ownership of household goods,165 and a common popular
assumption that spouses own property in common.166 A community of acquests
regime has the merit of flexibility, able to take account of the length of time a
159 Stair, Inst 1.4.9, 17 and 3.8.30; Erskine, Inst 1.6.12 and 2.9.19-21; Bell, Prin §§1549, 1574. See also
Anton (n 55) at 653-668.
160 Anton (n 55) at 668 quoting Lord President Cooper in Preston v Preston 1950 SC 253 at 257: “My
impression is that the wider aspect of the present problem may yet have to be solved by reintroducing
in a limited form the old conception of a communio bonorum so far as relates to the common home
and its maintenance.”
161 Intestate Succession and Legal Rights (Scot Law Com CM No 69, 1986) paras 4.4(b), 4.41.
162 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 s 10.
163 Intestate Succession and Legal Rights (n 161) para 4.21. At para 4.9 it is noted that in England and
Wales the Law Commission has also taken the view that a surviving spouse’s entitlement should at
least be equivalent to that of a divorcing spouse.
164 Intestate Succession and Legal Rights (n 161) paras 4.21, 4.28.
165 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 s 25.
166 Rowntree Report (n 40) 30.
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couple has been together and what they have acquired during that time. The
devil is certainly in the detail, but it may represent a more rational system
for apportioning family property between, for instance, the claims of a second
spouse after a brief marriage in competition with children of a previous lengthy
marriage which had generated most of that property. It would seem unreasonable
to restrict the freedom of a remarried parent to spend or dissipate inherited
assets whilst he or she was alive. But a community of acquests regime would be a
means of acknowledging the importance of the narrative that inherited assets still
identifiable on the death of the second parent should not “pass out of the family”.
In Pirie v Clydesdale Bank plc,167 Mr Pirie left his heritable property to his
adult daughter (who had learning difficulties) and moveable property of £60,000
to be divided between his wife and daughter. Mrs Pirie was his third wife, more
than 20 years his junior and a Philippine national whom he had persuaded to
come to Scotland leaving behind a lucrative job in Saudi Arabia. Shortly after
they married Mr Pirie gave up his job and for the next 16 years Mrs Pirie worked
full-time at various menial jobs, contributed all of her earnings to the household,
did all the cooking and cleaning and took care of her husband and his daughter,
latterly nursing him until his death from cancer. This was a morally difficult case
in that the now homeless Mrs Pirie was up against the deceased’s clear intention
to ensure that his daughter would have a roof over her head, despite having
promised the house to his wife. As she herself argued, she would have been better
off had she divorced him and gained the benefit of the matrimonial property
provisions rather than sticking with him and providing the care he needed prior to
death. It is surely bad social (and legal) policy for the law to provide an incentive
for a woman to divorce her husband rather than stay with him and take the risk
that in his declining years he could disinherit her.
F. CONCLUSION
Inheritance is not an esoteric issue. It will affect almost every citizen –we
all die and we all have loved ones who will die. In its discussion paper the
Scottish Law Commission seeks to reflect both the presumed wishes of testators
and also wider public opinion. Arguably, it does neither for most people want
their children to inherit and, under the proposals, children, above all, lose out.
The reform proposals are also based on ideological arguments, but this article
questions whether the prevailing ideology is consistent with research findings,
social behaviour and public attitudes. Such a radical change in the inheritance
167 [2006] CSOH 82, 2007 SCLR 18.
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regime could even be seen as an attempt to create a new ethic of family life.
The evidence that most families operate within a shared normative framework of
mutual obligations militates against such an ethic.
Few members of the public are likely to engage in the Commission’s
consultation process, and yet many will have strong views on the issues which the
paper covers. This is a debate which should not be confined to the legal profession
but which ought to take place in the public arena.
This article does not represent a plea for conservative family values, or for
a limitation on the freedom of individuals to live in family forms of their own
choosing. However, if succession law is to represent the society in which we live,
it must take account of reality. The weight of research evidence suggests that
most people want their assets to benefit their children after they die. There is no
public support or empirical evidence to suggest that children, even adult children,
should not have automatic inheritance rights. And on intestacy, notwithstanding
the difficulties inherent in complex family forms, some attempt ought to be made
to differentiate between the children of first and second marriages. It would be
an admission of failure if Scots law were unable to do so.
But perhaps the inheritance debate raises an even bigger question: what
criteria should underpin law reform? Political imperatives, social policy and
public opinion would be reasonable factors to take into account, as would
compatibility with the rest of the UK or harmonisation within Europe or certainty
and consistency in the way the law operates. This article has argued for the
importance of policy issues and public opinion. But even if the law should not
always give people what they want, a more compelling rationale must be advanced
for regime change than is found in the Scottish Law Commission’s discussion
paper.
